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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
 No. 10-3041 
 ____________ 
 
 DEBORAH REARICK, 
  Appellant 
v. 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY 
    
 ____________ 
 
 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 (D.C. Civ. No. 1:08-cv-01195)  
 District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane, Chief Judge 
 ____________ 
 
 Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
 February 9, 2011 
 Before:   JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR. and WEIS, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion filed March 4, 2011) 
 ____________ 
 
 OPINION  
____________ 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiff appeals two orders in this case.  The first denied her request for an 
extension of the discovery period; the second granted summary judgment in favor of 




 Because we write solely for the parties, we recite herein only the essential 
facts.  Plaintiff, who has worked for The Pennsylvania State University since 1981, 
brought suit against her employer, claiming that she was denied a promotion in 2006 in 
retaliation for reporting sexual harassment to the University‟s affirmative action office in 
2001.  She also asserted that defendant breached a contract by using her past performance 
assessments in evaluating her candidacy for that promotion.   
 After filing her complaint in 2008, plaintiff retained current counsel.  This 
attorney requested, and was granted, three extensions or stays of the discovery deadline, 
which totaled approximately seven months.  The parties had almost eleven months after 
counsel entered his appearance to conduct and complete discovery.  However, several 
weeks after the final discovery deadline had expired, plaintiff‟s counsel filed a “Motion 
for Enlargement of Time to Complete Discovery” and a motion to compel discovery.  The 
District Court denied those motions on May 5, 2010.  On June 17, 2010, summary 
judgment was entered in favor of defendant. 
 Plaintiff states that medical issues prevented her attorney from completing 
discovery in accordance with the (thrice-revised) scheduling order.  We are not persuaded 
that the “denial of discovery „made it impossible [for plaintiff] to obtain crucial 
evidence,‟” nor has plaintiff satisfied her burden of showing that “„more diligent 
discovery was impossible‟” under the circumstances.  See Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, 
Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass‟n, 107 F.3d 1026, 1032 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Fine Paper 
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Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 818 (3d Cir. 1982)).  We therefore find no abuse of 
discretion.  See id. at 1032-33. 
 Nor do we find error in the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment on 
the plaintiff‟s retaliation claims.  After careful review of the record, we find nothing more 
than the plaintiff‟s own speculation supporting her allegation that retaliatory animus was 
a factor in the denial of her application for promotion.  See Watson v. Se. Pa. Transp. 
Auth., 207 F.3d 207, 215 (3d Cir. 2000) (discussing showing required for retaliation 
claim).   Mere allegations are not sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact 
for purposes of summary judgment.  See Lexington Ins. Co. v. W. Pa. Hosp., 423 F.3d 
318, 333 (3d Cir. 2005)  (“Speculation does not create a genuine issue of fact” (quoting 
Hedberg v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., Inc., 47 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1995))). 
 With respect to the plaintiff‟s breach of contract claim, we have reviewed 
the Agreement and General Release and find it to be “a contract complete within itself . . . 
. represent[ing] the parties‟ entire agreement.” Yocca v. Pittsburgh Steelers Sports, Inc., 
854 A.2d 425, 436 (Pa. 2004) (internal quotations omitted).  The contract‟s silence on the 
matter of the plaintiff‟s past performance evaluation scores does not amount to ambiguity. 
 See Seven Springs Farm, Inc. v. Croker, 748 A.2d 740, 744 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) 
(“[W]hen a contract fails to provide for a specific contingency, it is silent, not 
ambiguous” and court should neither consider extrinsic evidence nor “read into the 
contract a term . . . which clearly it does not contain”).    
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The District Court‟s grant of summary judgment on this claim was, therefore, proper.   
 Accordingly, the District Court‟s orders will be affirmed.  
 
